We develop a model based on asymmetric information (adverse selection) that provides a rational explanation for the persistent use of royalties alongside equity in university technology transfer. The model shows how royalties, through their value-destroying distortions, can act as a screening tool that allows a less informed principal, such as the university's Technology Transfer Office (TTO), to elicit private information from the more informed spin-off. We also show that equity-royalty contracts outperform fixed-fee-royalty contracts as they cause fewer value-destroying distortions. Furthermore, we show that our main result is robust to problems of moral hazard. Beside the co-existence result, the model also offers explanations for the empirical findings that equity generates higher returns than royalty and that TTOs willing to take equity in lieu of fixed fees are more successful in creating spin-offs.
exists in Europe (Geuna and Nesta 2006) ), such companies are required to strike a licensing deal with the university's Technology Transfer Office (TTO). When granting the license the TTO aims to retain some of the value of the technology for the university.
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One notable example of a university spin-off is Google, founded in 1998 by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, two graduate students at Stanford University, to commercialize their PageRank algorithm for Internet search. The now phenomenally successful Internet giant first raised money from angel investors and subsequently from VC funds and a public offering. Stanford granted the exclusive license to Google for the Page-Rank algorithm in exchange for an equity stake, which by 2005 was liquidated for $336M (Krieger 2005) . Stanford also receives annual royalties from Google, which in 2011 were approximately $400,000 (GoogleDPS 2012). Although Google is an exceptionally successful spin-off, it is not an exception when it comes to the manner in which university TTOs participate in the profits of their spin-offs. As reported in a number of empirical and survey studies (Bray and Lee 2000 , Feldman et al. 2002 , and confirmed by the university TTOs we interviewed, the terms of the licensing deal typically include royalty payments and equity stakes as well as fixed fees. According to the STATT database, which collects comprehensive data from members of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), of all the US university TTOs reporting licensing income for the year 2009, 25.4% reported income from sales of equity stakes in addition to royalty income, up from 14.2% in 1996, when the survey started collecting income data.
Both royalty payments, which are payments proportional to the sales of the spin-off, and equity stakes, which are a share of (future) profits, are deferred payments: royalties become payable once the spin-off begins to make sales, while equity stakes generate payments through dividends once the spin-off becomes profitable, or through selling the equity stake directly either after the spin-off goes public or to a third party. They are also contingent payments in the sense that they depend on how well the spin-off performs in the future.
While there exist strong theoretical results that suggest that up-front fixed-fee licensing generates a higher profit for the owner of the innovation than contingent payments (see review by Kamien (1992) ), two reasons may explain the prevalence of the latter in the case of university spin-offs.
First, spin-offs are typically cash starved (Feldman et al. 2002) -even spin-offs with access to VC funding try to stretch their limited funding as far as possible, which is not well served by up-front fixed-fee payments to the TTO. Second, there is a moral hazard problem which contingent payments 1 TTO managers and university administrators surveyed by Jensen and Thursby (2001) thought that generating revenue for the university was the most important objective of the TTO, while faculty considered this to be (only narrowly) the second most important objective after securing funding for sponsored research. Furthermore, the goal to "create discretionary income" features in the mission statement of many prominent Technology Licensing Offices, for example, that of MIT (http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/about/our_mission.html). might help to resolve, especially when university staff who are not directly involved in the spin-off need to continue providing support for the successful development of the technology . However, when comparing royalty payments to equity stakes in these models, it is generally accepted that equity Pareto dominates royalty as the latter distorts production . Recall that the optimal production level occurs at the point where the marginal costs are equal to the marginal revenues. Royalties payable to the TTO reduce marginal revenues but not marginal costs, thus reducing the optimal production quantity (under mild conditions).
On the contrary, equity stakes do not create such a distortion as they offer the TTO a stake in the profits, and not just revenues, leaving the optimal production level unaffected. Since royalties appear to be Pareto dominated, the persistence of TTOs in continuing to use royalties alongside equity is a puzzle.
The use of royalties is even more puzzling as Bray and Lee (2000) show that on average equity generates more value for the university than royalties do. One plausible explanation for this is offered by Feldman et al. (2002) , who attribute the reluctance of the TTO to take on more equity over royalties to behavioral factors; TTOs are initially unwilling to experiment with new forms of payment, such as equity stakes, but as they become more experienced and more familiar with this new way of licensing technology they tend to increase the proportion of equity deals in their portfolio. Nevertheless, even the most experienced universities in their sample continue to take on royalties.
Our paper provides a model of licensing based on asymmetric information that can explain the persistent use of royalties alongside equity in university technology transfer. The model assumes that the management of the spin-off, which usually includes the university members who invented the new technology, along with their experienced VC backers, are better informed than the TTO about the demand curve of the new technology. In particular, since the management of the spinoff is actively making decisions regarding product design, we assume that they are better able to estimate the consumers' heterogenous willingness to pay for the spin-off's product, resulting in an adverse selection problem.
2 We use this model to show that in equilibrium, it is optimal for the TTO to offer contracts that include royalties alongside equity. Even though royalties destroy value by distorting production, we show that they can provide a screening mechanism that the TTO can use to extract information about the potential market value of the product. This prevents spin-offs that have a higher ex-ante probability of generating valuable products from extracting full information rents at the expense of the TTO. Furthermore, we find that the equilibrium contract intended for spin-offs with higher-value products contains lower (or even zero) royalties than the contract offered to spin-offs with lower-value products. This result provides a potential explanation for the empirical observation that equity offers higher returns than royalty -equity is the licensing method of choice for high-value spin-offs.
Expanding the contract space to include fixed fees in addition to equity and royalty provides a further interesting insight. Our model provides a potential explanation as to why fixed fees are a less favored mechanism for university technology transfer to spin-offs that goes beyond capital constraints. We show that in the presence of asymmetric information, it is more effective for the TTO to use equity-royalty rather than fixed-fee-royalty contracts as a screening mechanism. We show that the former achieves the desirable screening outcome at a lower royalty level than the latter, which in turn implies less value destruction through production distortions. In fact, we show that, as far as asymmetric information (i.e. adverse selection) is concerned, fixed fees are completely redundant, i.e. the TTO does not improve anything by expanding the contract space to include fixed fees alongside equity and royalty.
Finally, we present an extension in which we endogenize the spin-off's probability of technical success. We assume that it is a function of costly and unverifiable effort which needs to be exerted by the spin-off, thus raising a moral hazard problem. In the absence of adverse selection (i.e. when the TTO and the spin-off are symmetrically informed) we show that there exists a pecking order of contracting terms: fixed fees dominate equity which causes effort distortions, and equity dominates royalty which causes both effort and production distortions. Nevertheless, we show that if there is also a problem of adverse selection, then the optimal contract contains not only fixed fees but also equity and royalty. Thus our main result -that royalties should co-exist with equity in the presence of asymmetric information -is robust to the presence of a moral hazard problem.
Before we proceed it is worth noting that universities, for which technology transfer is a pertinent issue, are not the only organizations interested in understanding how to best license technology. 
Literature Review
The phenomenon of university entrepreneurship is an increasingly important topic of academic investigation (see the detailed literature review by Rothaermel et al. (2007) ). For the purposes of this paper we will focus on the two strands of literature to which our paper makes the most direct contribution: first, the literature on the economics of technology licensing and its application to university licensing; and second, the empirical literature on university technology transfer, which provides evidence that our model helps explain.
Since the initial theoretical investigation on the merits of IP rights pioneered by Arrow (1962) , a substantial body of research has developed with a focus on licensing. A large part of this literature starts with an innovator who needs to license a new technology to incumbent firms which operate in a monopoly (or oligopoly) setting and, in contrast to the innovator, have in place the complementary assets necessary to commercialize the technology (Teece 1986 ). The literature is concerned with examining the trade-offs between licensing based on a combination of fixed fees and royalties. A general finding of early research is that inventor rents are maximized through fixed fees (see review by Kamien (1992) ). Contingent payments such as royalties are dominated by fixed fees because they distort production or slow down adoption when network effects are important (Sun et al. 2004 ). The co-existence of royalties alongside fixed fees has been justified in a principal-agent framework by the presence of asymmetric information (Gallini and Wright 1990 , Beggs 1992 , Sen 2005b or moral hazard (Choi 2001, Jensen and , or both (Crama et al. 2008, Xiao and Xu 2012) . In these papers, the contingent nature of royalties turns them into either an information extraction mechanism (via signalling or screening) or a motivational device which better aligns the interests (and efforts) of all parties involved. Various other reasons for the co-existence of royalties and fixed fees have also been identified in the literature. In a model with inventor moral hazard, Dechenaux et al. (2009) and Dechenaux et al. (2011) argue that royalties become optimal only when the licensee is risk averse. Erat et al. (2013) find that royalties should co-exist with fixed fees to moderate downstream competition among licensees, while Sen and Stamatopoulos (2009) argue that royalties co-exist with fixed fees to raise the market price back to monopoly prices.
Perhaps because the aforementioned work is motivated by licensing to incumbents, it does not explicitly consider equity. Indeed, for incumbent firms with a portfolio of revenue streams, equity stakes, in contrast to royalty payments, have little informational content as the value of equity is less well linked with the market performance of the specific technology being licensed. In this case, equity can be thought of as a form of financing. In contrast, the literature on university technology transfer, which is partly motivated by licensing to spin-offs, examines equity licensing explicitly.
The main finding is that, due to moral hazard problems, some contingent payments are necessary in order to incentivize university researchers to continue supporting the spin-off, but in general equity is superior to royalties . Since the superiority of equity over royalties is well established in the literature, part of the extant literature has chosen to ignore royalties altogether as a viable means of technology transfer (Macho-Stadler et al. 2008) . Our paper is similar in spirit to the models of technology licensing under asymmetric information, with an important distinction:
We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first investigation into contracts that combine equity, royalty and fixed fees to show that in the presence of asymmetric information (adverse selection), the equilibrium outcome is to offer contracts that include both equity and royalty terms, and that equity-royalty contracts perform better than fixed-fee-royalty contracts. We also examine how moral hazard, in combination with adverse selection, affects our results.
Turning to the empirical literature on the licensing terms of university technology to spin-offs we note four findings. First, there exists ample survey evidence to suggest that most TTOs license technology to spin-offs with a combination of equity, royalty and fixed fees. For example, Jensen and Thursby (2001) report, based on a survey of the leading US research universities, that 23% of all university licenses include equity. Of these equity-based licenses, 79% also include royalties and 67%
include up-front fixed fees. Based on their interviews with TTO managers, the authors report that licenses with equity tend to be given to spin-offs rather than established firms. Similarly, Feldman et al. (2002) find that most TTOs included in their survey rely heavily on royalty-based licensing.
Nevertheless they report an increasing trend in the use of equity: while only 40% of TTOs had equity deals in their portfolios in 1992, by 2000, this proportion had increased to 70%. Second, as reported in Feldman et al. (2002) , the TTOs with the highest proportion of deals that include some element of equity in their portfolios are more likely to be based in more experienced universities.
The authors interpret this as evidence for the superiority of equity over royalties and argue that, with experience, universities will come to overcome their behavioral bias against equity stakes and adopt them more frequently. Third, as reported by Bray and Lee (2000) based on a small sample survey, equity-based licensing is more profitable for the TTO in the long run than fixed fees or royalties. Although the return may be partially attributed to a few highly successful spin-offs that offer multimillion-dollar returns, even excluding these outliers, the authors find that equity returns are similar to the returns of fixed fees and royalties. Fourth, as shown in Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) , based on data from 116 universities covered by AUTM from 1994 to 1998, TTOs that are willing to take equity in lieu of fixed fees are more successful in creating spin-offs. Our work provides an explanation, based on asymmetric information, which is fully consistent with rational behavior that explains why royalties co-exist with equity, predicts that equity stakes are more profitable than royalty, and explains why TTOs willing to take equity in lieu of fixed fees are more successful in spin-off creation.
Base Model
University technology transfer is a complex process with multiple stakeholders, some of which might be driven by nonpecuniary motivations such as generating knowledge. We do not cover all of the complexities of this problem. Instead, we aim to develop a model that investigates the implications of the spin-off's private information on the contract parameters chosen by the TTO.
Symmetric information without uncertainty
We begin the modeling section with a simple deterministic and symmetric information model that aims to demonstrate why, at least in theory, it is more attractive to transfer technology through equity or fixed-fee and not royalty-based contracts. Throughout the analysis, we follow the standard assumption of the technology licensing literature that the spin-off, upon successful completion of the technology, becomes a monopolist facing a market M of potential consumers who hold heterogenous valuations for the product. For analytical tractability we assume that the customers' heterogenous willingness to pay for the product follows the uniform distribution. To make this precise, for any price P we assume that the number of customers holding valuations less or equal to P is given by
Without loss of generality we can normalize M = 1. Furthermore, we find it convenient to define m as the mean customer willingness to pay and δ as the dispersion from this mean valuation, i.e. a = m − δ and b = m + δ. Note that the condition α ≥ 0 implies that δ ≤ m. Using these definitions, the quantity demanded at price a ≤ P ≤ b is given by Q(P ) = δ−P +m 2δ
, which is the linear demand curve. The assumption of a linear demand curve is often made in the technology licensing literature (Giebe and Wolfstetter 2008 , Sen and Tauman 2007 , Sen 2005a .
One can think of δ+m 2δ
as the hypothetical demand for the new product had the price been zero and 1 2δ
as a measure of how price sensitive consumers are. Interestingly, for a fixed mean willingness to pay m, as the heterogeneity in consumers' willing to pay measured by δ increases, the demand curve rotates counterclockwise, i.e. the product is appealing to inherently fewer albeit less price-sensitive customers (Johnson and Myatt 2006) . Products with inherently low heterogeneity are commercialized with what can be called mass-market strategies i.e. the firm sells at a relatively low price to a large number of price-sensitive consumers, while products with inherently high heterogeneity can be though of as love it or hate it offerings that are best commercialized with what can be called nichemarket strategies, i.e. sell at a relatively high price to few loyal and not particularly price-sensitive customers (see Johnson and Myatt (2006) for a more general discussion and implications).
Under the assumption that the new technology will allow the spin-off to act as a monopolist, the value of a self-funded spin-off company that does not need to make any payments to the TTO, is
given by (P − c)Q(P ) − C, where c denotes the variable production cost and C denotes the fixed development cost that the spin-off will incur before it can commence production. These costs are adjusted appropriately to account for the cost of capital and technical risk of the project. Therefore, assuming that 0 ≤ c < δ + m, the value of the spin-off company is maximized at production level
and is equal to
In the context of the problem we are studying, the spin-off has to license the technology from the TTO, which is the legal owner of the technology. Previous work in university technology transfer assumes that the TTO represents the interests of both the university's central administration and the university members that created the technology , Dechenaux et al. 2009 , Dechenaux et al. 2011 . This is a reasonable assumption in the context of licensing to incumbents as the creators of the technology are unlikely to have direct involvement with the licensee. In contrast, the creators of the technology typically have a direct and significant involvement in the management of the spin-offs, usually as co-founders. Therefore, in our setting we find it more reasonable to lump together the interests of the academics and those of the spin-off, which could also represent the interests of any outside investors, who we assume have come to an understanding on how to proceed with the development of the technology.
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Given our modeling assumptions, if financing constraints on the part of the spin-off were not an issue, such licensing could clearly occur frictionlessly on the basis of a fixed fee payable up front. We will study fixed fees in Section 5, but for now we assume that they are not a possibility. We continue by examining an equity-based license in which the TTO retains a share 1 − e ≥ 0 in the spin-off's future profit. As in Jensen and Thursby (2001) , we assume that equity is purely a profit-sharing device, which is given to the TTO as payment for the exclusive license to use the technology. All decision rights remain with the spin-off. This is consistent with typical TTO policy of not being actively involved with the running affairs of its spin-offs. The rest of the equity e > 0 is retained by the spin-off. The value of the spin-off will be given by e(P − c)Q(P ) − C, which is maximized when the production quantity Q is set to Q = (m+δ−c) 4δ
. The equity stake (1 − e) assigned to the TTO has no implications for the optimal production quantity; there is no production distortion and no value is destroyed.
Instead of being based on equity, the license could be based on royalty payments. These payments can be a fixed amount r ≥ 0 per item sold or a percentage of total sales. For tractability purposes we take the former definition. The spin-off's value in a technology transfer contract that is based on such per item royalty payments is given by (P − (c + r))Q(P ) − C, which is maximized when the production quantity is equal to Q * (r) = max{0,
}. Clearly, this optimal production quantity is non-increasing in the royalty rate r, hence there is production distortion. Effectively, the royalty payable to the TTO inflates the variable cost per item from c to c + r. Therefore the spin-off that has to pay royalties will produce a smaller quantity and sell at a higher price than the equity-based spin-off. Assuming 0 ≤ r ≤ m + δ − c, the value of the spin-off company is given
− C and, more importantly, the value destroyed by the royalty is given by
, which is non-negative for any r > 0.
Demand Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry
The base model presented in the previous section, although helpful for illustrating the distortional effects of royalties and pointing out how they can be circumvented by either fixed-fee or equitybased contracts, is clearly a simplification. In particular, it makes two assumptions that are hard to justify. First, it assumes that both the management of the spin-off and the TTO know with certainty what the demand curve is going to be. This is unlikely to be the case as university spin-offs are often commercialize new products for which customers' willingness to pay is unknown and hard to forecast. In particular, certain product features may turn out to be well liked by some consumers but not by others, leading to significant uncertainty regarding how heterogenous preferences for the new product will be. To capture this uncertainty we assume that while the average willingness to pay is known to be m, the dispersion of the willingness to pay δ will turn out to be either of type h with some probability α or l with probability 1 − α, with respective dispersion parameters δ h and δ l . Furthermore, we assume that m − c > δ h > δ l > 0, which suggests that the consumer that likes the product the least has a valuation at least as high as the marginal cost of production. Under this condition, both the optimal production quantity and the value of projects are decreasing in δ, suggesting that low dispersion leads to mass-market products (where the new product appeals to a large proportion of relatively homogenous consumers), while high dispersion leads to niche market products (where the product appeals only to a few consumers who are at the right-tail of the willingness-to-pay distribution). This formulation is a first step in capturing the highly uncertain market potential of early-stage innovation.
The second assumption made in the previous section that we would like to relax is that both parties are symmetrically informed. As Shane and Stuart (2002) argue, "entrepreneurs are privy to more information about the prospects of their ventures and the abilities of and level of commitment of the founding team." In particular, it is the management of the spin-off that makes the product design and marketing decisions, which affect perceptions of product value. Since such decisions are not observable by the TTO, it is reasonable to assume that the spin-off's management is in a better position to estimate whether the product is more likely to be a mass-market hit or a niche product (i.e. how dispersed the willingness to pay of its target customers will be) than the TTO.
To capture this asymmetry, we assume that the spin-off can be of either type B or type G. Spinoffs of type G (B) have a probability, θ G (θ B ) of generating projects of type l and θ G > θ B . The management of the spin-off knows its type while the TTO does not. Instead, the TTO believes the spin-off to be of type G with probability 1 − β and B with probability β. It is perhaps helpful to think of the setting as follows: The TTO has a belief about the probability of demand dispersion
, and of type h, with probability
This belief, although true on expectation for any spin-off, does not take into account some spin-off specific information which the management is in a position to hold. Conditional on this information, the management can resolve some, but not all, of the uncertainty and is able to establish more accurately whether demand will be of type h or l. 4 We also find it useful to express θ G = θ B + γ, which allows us to use γ > 0 as a measure of the informational disadvantage of the TTO. Clearly, when γ → 0 the beliefs of the TTO and the spin-off become symmetric. As the parameter γ increases so does the informational disadvantage of the TTO. The TTO knows that the spin-off has superior information, and all parameters are common knowledge. The information structure is summarized in Figure 1 . Note that both the spin-off of type G and type B have the potential of generating projects of type h or l; they differ only in the probability of generating such a scenario. This specification renders 4 Our assumption of asymmetric information on customer heterogeneity is in contrast to extant literature, which, motivated by technology transfer from innovators to incumbent firms, usually assumes that the asymmetric information is on the production cost c. We make this assumption because we believe that production costs are less important for spin-offs, many of which focus on digital or service-like products with relatively low production costs. Nevertheless, we can show that our results are qualitatively unaffected under different information assumptions such as an iso-elastic demand function with asymmetric information on production costs.
it impossible to verify the type of spin-off, even if the demand is observable and verifiable ex-post.
After all, a G-type spin-off can always claim to be a B-type and if the project turns out to be of type h it can always claim to have been lucky. This inherent uncertainty in the demand of the end product, which allows the spin-off to mask its true type even ex-post, renders the TTO unable to offer spin-off-type dependent contracts.
Equity and Royalty Contracts
In this section we will focus on contracts that belong in the set (e, r)
e is the equity stake offered to the spin-off and r is the royalty per quantity sold payable to the TTO. Under such a contract, the production quantity is given by Q j (r) = m+δ j −c−r 4δ j for j ∈ {h, l} and the expected value of the spin-off of type i ∈ {G, B}, excluding development costs C, is given
for j ∈ {h, l}. The value appropriated by the TTO when the spin-off is of type i ∈ {G, B} is given by
The first term is the expected value of the TTO's equity share while the second is the expected cashflow from royalties. As at the time the contract is signed the TTO knows the type of project only in distribution, the expected value of the TTO over the possible project types is given by U (e, r) = βU B (e, r) + (1 − β)U G (e, r).
Equity-only Contract
When information about the project type at the time the contract is signed is common knowledge, the TTO can extract all rents simply by setting the royalty to zero to avoid distortions and set a type-dependent equity that is high enough to allow the spin-off to recoup its investment costs but no more than that:
Under asymmetric information and demand uncertainty, if the TTO was to offer the two contracts described above, the G-type spin-off would always pretend to be a B-type, thus appropriating all informational rents. The TTO is left with two options: either offer e B and allow the commercialization of both types of projects at the expense of giving up all informational rents to the G-type spin-off, or offer e G < e B and appropriate all rents from the G-type spin-off but at the expense of preventing further commercialization by B-types. Which of the two is more preferable will depend on whether the difference in value between type G and type B spin-offs is greater than the value of type B spin-offs, appropriately adjusted for how likely a spin-off is to be type G vs type B. The exact value is summarized in the proposition below, whose proof is straightforward and we omit for brevity. Proposition 1. The optimal equity-only contract is given by
Since there is no element of the contract that can be made contingent on the distribution of customer valuations, there is no way for the TTO to offer a contract that would differentiate between the two types without excluding the B-types. As university TTOs have a number of other objectives besides purely maximizing profit it is unlikely that they would be purposely preventing viable technology from being licensed. However, we should point out that if equity-only contracts are offered, this might well be the optimal behavior.
Equity and Royalty Contract: A Separating Equilibrium
As we have seen, an equity-only contract does not allow the TTO to license technology to both spin-off types without giving up all information rents. It is worth investigating whether a joint equity and royalty contract can fare better. Here we focus on separating equilibria, which allow the TTO to license to both types. Appealing to the revelation principle (Myerson 1979) , and without loss of generality, we can assume that the TTO will offer a menu of two contracts, (e G , r G ) and (e B , r B ), the first intended for the G-type and the second for the B-type spin-off. The TTO will choose the contract terms that solve the following constrained optimization problem,
such that
where U i (e, r) is given by (1). The first two constraints, often referred to as incentive compatibility constraints, ensure that a spin-off of type G will prefer the equity-royalty contract designed for type G over that designed for type B and vice versa. The next two constraints, often called individual rationality or participation constraints, ensure that both types of spin-off receive a non-negative expected payoff. Subject to these constraints, the TTO would like to maximize its own payoff from the licensing agreement. Royalties are assumed to be positive as we do not want to consider contracts where the university subsidizes spin-offs -such contracts are not observed in practice.
For the results that follow we find it useful to define two quantities, r and r, which are the royalty levels that make the value of the G-type spin-off equal to the value of the B-type spin-off (i.e. π B (r) = π G (r)) and the participation constraint of the B-type that retains 100% equity binding (i.e. π B (r) = C). Analytically, r and r can be written as
The optimal contract is summarized with the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under equity-royalty contracts, a unique separating equilibrium exists and is characterized by
where r * is the root of the equation
.
All proofs are presented in the Appendix. Proposition 2 shows that when there is asymmetric information about customers' heterogenous willingness to pay, royalties coexist with equity. In this case the TTO can extract information from the more informed spin-off by offering two contracts:
one with equity e G and no royalties intended for the G-type and one with higher equity e B > e G and high enough royalties r B > 0 intended for the B-type.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2 it is important to emphasize that royalties have an asymmetric impact on the two types of spin-off. As the production quantity is decreasing in the heterogeneity of customers' willingness to pay (δ), the value destroyed by royalties is greater for projects with relatively low demand dispersion δ l (mass-market strategy) than for projects with relatively high demand dispersion δ h (niche strategy). Therefore the value lost due to royalty distortions is greater for the G-type spin-off, which has a higher probability of creating the massmarket product, than for the B-type spin-off. This asymmetric distortion can be exploited by the TTO to increase its payoff compared to the equity-only case (where both types are offered the equity stake that makes the participation constraint of the B-type binding). It can do so by adding a small fraction of royalties to the contract intended for the B-type and at the same time increasing the B-type's equity stake just enough that the participation constraint is still binding. The G-type will not want to pretend that it is of B-type in order to get the higher equity stake as the royalties would harm it more than the B-type and the extra equity allocated to the B-type would not be enough to cover this loss. In fact, since royalties are so undesirable for the G-type, the TTO can decrease the equity stake of the G-type by a little as well. The TTO can continue adding royalties and increasing the equity stake of the B-type and at the same time decreasing the equity stake of the G-type until one of the following happens:
1. Either it extracts all of the rents from the G-type in which case there is no need to continue increasing royalties (r B = r), or 2. The equity allocated to the B-type has reached 100% and therefore it cannot increase the royalty and equity offering any further (r B = r), or 3. The value destroyed by further increasing royalties of the B-type is greater than the extra value the TTO appropriates by further decreasing the equity stake of the G-type (r B = r * ).
It is worth making a few observations here. First, we find that there exist spin-offs of sufficiently low value (B-type) for which it is optimal for the TTO to retain no equity and instead license the technology with royalties (equal to r) only. This is consistent with the empirical observation that some spin-offs license technology exclusively through royalties without the TTO having any equity participation. Second, we find that sufficiently high-value (G-type) spin-offs, which have a higher probability of producing a more valuable product, are offered a contract with zero royalties. This is consistent with the observation that, on average, equity licensing generates a higher revenue for the TTO than royalty licensing (Bray and Lee 2000) . Proposition 2 suggests that this effect may be due not to equity being an inherently better way of licensing university technology, but to selection bias: ceteris paribus, technology that is more likely to generate high-value (mass-market) products is more likely to be licensed with equity and technology that is most likely to be of low value (niche products) is more likely to be licensed through a contract that relies heavily (or exclusively) on royalties.
We continue by investigating how the level of royalties offered to the B-type spin-off are affected by the amount of capital investment (C) incurred by the spin-off and the extend of asymmetric information present between the TTO and the spin-off (γ) where θ G = θ B + γ.
Proposition 3. If the following sufficient condition holds
, then
• the royalty rate r B is non-decreasing in asymmetric information γ,
• the equity stake e B is non-decreasing in asymmetric information γ and in capital cost C.
The above proposition shows that if customers are sufficiently heterogenous in their willingness to pay, then both the royalty rate given to the B-type and the equity stake the B-type is allowed to retain in the spin-off are in general increasing as the problem of asymmetric information becomes more pronounced. More surpassingly, while the royalty rate r B is non-monotone in the capital investment C required by the spin-off, the equity stake is non-decreasing. This happens as the increase in the investment cost C necessitates that the spin-off retains a larger share of the profits in order to offset these higher costs. When the costs are increasing from a low basis this is best achieved by allowing the B-type to retain a higher equity stake e B , coupled with a higher royalty rate r B to prevent the G-type from mimicking. However, as the costs continue to increase to the point where the equity stake retained by the B-type cannot increase further (i.e. e B = 1), then the TTO finds it necessary to start reducing the royalty payments of the B-type (i.e r is decreasing in C) to allow the B-type to recover its investment cost C. value to the product. Furthermore, this is only a sufficient condition; numerically we find that the result of Proposition 3 holds for almost all of the parameter values we tried. The results of Proposition 3 are potentially interesting as, to the extent that the capital investment C required by the spin-off can be directly observed and the amount of asymmetric information γ between the TTO and the management of the spin-off can be proxied by how experienced a university TTO is, they can be tested empirically.
A final note is that equity works well as a screening device in case of licensing to single-technology spin-offs. For multi-product companies it will not be as effective because the value it generates is linked to the portfolio of projects/products owned by the firm and therefore its value is not 100%
tied to the quality of the university originated-innovation.
Numerical Investigation
In order to gain a better understanding of how the combination of equity and royalty terms perform, we conduct a detailed numerical analysis. We vary the proportion of B-type spin-offs in the population (β), the gap between the high and low-demand dispersion scenarios (τ = δ h − δ l ), and the severity of informational asymmetry (γ = θ G − θ B ). A summary of all parameters used in the figures throughout the paper are given in Table 1 .
(a) (b) Figure 2 Equity-Only and Equity-Royalty Contract Regions Figure 2a depicts the two regions of Proposition 1. The TTO can offer the pooling contract and license to both types leaving the G-type with full information rents (gray region) or exclude the B-type by offering the contract that extracts all rents from the G-type (black region). Intuitively, the latter region occurs when there is a low probability the spin-off is a B-type (low β) or when the gap between the expected values of the two types of spin-off is substantial (high τ ).
As shown in Proposition 2, expanding the contract space to allow for royalties alongside equity allows the TTO to separate the two types without excluding the B-type spin-off. This indeed happens in the white and the gray regions of Figure 2b . In the black region of the same figure the TTO continues to find it optimal not to license technology to the B-type spin-off. The white region is of interest as for the model parameters that fall in these region the TTO would have preferred to exclude the B-type had royalty not been an option. We can therefore conclude that the use of royalties with equity not only allows the TTO to extract more rents but perhaps more importantly also permits the licensing of technology to B-type spin-offs that it would otherwise have been optimal to exclude. In this white region royalties may still be regarded as inefficient from a production decision perspective. However, they may be dubbed welfare improving from a system perspective as the B-type is no longer excluded.
We also take a closer look at the optimal royalty charged by the TTO. We do so to observe what effect the severity of the asymmetric information problem (γ) has on the royalty rate charged and on the value extracted by this royalty. As shown in Proposition 3 the optimal royalty r * is (weakly) increasing in γ. This can be observed from the dashed line of Figure 3 . The solid lines in Figure 3 represent the percentage of the total value appropriated by the TTO that is attributed to royalties.
This can be read off the primary y-axis. The solid gray line shows the expected income generated directly by royalties while the solid black line gives the indirect value generated by royalties defined as the excess value extracted from the G-type spin-off, when compared to the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1. As the asymmetric information problem becomes more severe, a larger proportion of the value generated by royalties is indirect. In Figure 3 the proportion of the indirect value from royalties to the total value from royalties is as high as 45%. 
Contracts with Fixed Fees
While we have concentrated on the use of royalties alongside equity until now, the prior licensing literature has primarily focused on the use of royalties alongside fixed fees. The main finding is similar to ours in the sense that the principal is successful in extracting information from (or signaling information to) the licensee by offering a contract with fixed-fee payments only intended for the "high-value" licensee and a contract with a combination of royalties and fixed fees intended for the "low-value" licensee (Gallini and Wright 1990 , Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 1991 , Sen 2005b ).
The use of fixed fees instead of equity in university technology transfer is limited practically because small entrepreneurial companies such as university spin-offs are typically cash starved (Feldman et al. 2002) . This "funding gap" has been well documented and a number of market imperfection hypotheses have been proposed to explain its prevalence (Himmelberg and Petersen 1994, Hall and Lerner 2010) . In this section we seek to understand whether there is anything special about the use of equity in technology transfer to spin-offs that goes beyond funding constraints. We do so by first examining fixed-fee-royalty contracts and compare them with the equity-royalty contracts of the previous section. We subsequently expand the contract space to allow the inclusion all of equity, fixed fees, and royalties.
Fixed-fee and Royalty Contracts
We begin our analysis by examining contracts that belong in the set (F, r)
where F is the fixed fee payable up front and r is the royalty per quantity produced payable to the TTO. The TTO can offer a menu of two contracts with F i and r i intended for spin-off i ∈ {G, B}, respectively. The production decision of the spin-off is not affected by fixed fees and the value of the spin-off having to pay royalties r in demand scenario j ∈ {l, h} is once again given by V j (r) =
. The expected value of a spin-off of type i excluding development costs and fixed fees payable to the TTO is given by π i (r i ) = θ i V l (r i ) + (1 − θ i )V h (r i ) and the value appropriated by the spin-off is given by π i (r i ) − F i − C. The TTO's payoff from a spin-off of type i is given by
, and the optimization problem of the TTO is given by:
The separating equilibrium contract is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under fixed-fee-royalty contracts, a unique separating equilibrium exists and is characterized by
where
Proposition 4 implies that fixed-fee-royalty contracts can be used in a similar way to equity-royalty contracts to create a separating equilibrium. The TTO can offer two contracts; one that includes a relatively low fixed fee and positive royalties intended for the B-type spin-off and another with a relatively high fixed fees and no royalties intended for the G-type spin-off. Similarly to the equityroyalty case, this fixed-fee-royalty contract achieves separation as the royalties destroy more value for the G-type spin-off, which is willing to pay a higher fixed fee than the B-type in order to avoid royalties. The following proposition compares the level of royalties required to achieve separation in the equity-royalty case to the fixed-fee-royalty case.
Proposition 5. The optimal royalties r B of the separating equity-royalty contract are lower (or equal) to the royalties of the fixed-fee-royalty contract.
This result shows that while both equity-royalty contracts and fixed-fee-royalty contracts allow the TTO to extract information from the spin-off, for any model parameters the former does so with lower royalties than the latter. Since royalties cause production distortions which destroy value for both the spin-off and the TTO, this result suggests that equity-royalty contracts are superior to fixed-fee-royalty contracts when a less informed principal wants to license technology to a betterinformed agent.
To understand why a lower royalty level is sufficient to separate the two types in the equityroyalty case than in the fixed-fee-royalty case, recall that any given level of royalty creates more severe distortions for the G-type spin-off than for the B-type, which discourages the G-type from misrepresenting its type in order to take the lower fixed fee or higher equity stake intended for the B-type. Furthermore, for any given level of royalty, the value taken away by royalties as far as the spin-off is concerned is decreasing in the equity retained by a spin-off. In the case of fixed-fee-royalty contracts both types of spin-off receive the same equity stake (100%), therefore the difference in distortion between the two types of spin-offs is caused solely by the difference in royalties. In the case of equity-royalty contracts, the G-type spin-off retains a smaller share of the equity than the B-type spin-off and therefore the G-type would experience even more distortions if it were to misrepresent its type. The way in which equity and royalties interact to enhance the distortions experienced by the G-type value spin-off vis-a-vis the B-type value spin-off allows the TTO to extract information at a lower royalty level, thereby causing less severe production distortions. 
Numerical Investigation
Having established analytically that the royalty required to achieve separation is higher in the fixedfee-royalty to the equity-royalty contracts, in this section we present a numerical examination of this difference and its implications for technology licensing. Figure 4a confirms the result of Proposition 5 and also allows us to observe the magnitude of the difference between the royalty rates required to achieve separation when combined with fixed fee vs. equity. Even for modest values of asymmetric information γ the gap is substantial, and this was the case for most of the model parameters we tried.
Perhaps more importantly, the gap is increasing as asymmetric information becomes more prevalent.
Since the value destroyed by royalties is increasing in the royalty rate, this finding suggests that fixed-fee-royalty contracts may be substantially more inefficient than equity-royalty contracts -in fact, as we show next, this inefficiency sometimes outweighs the benefits of extracting information.
As in Figure 2b of Section 4.3, in Figure 4b we vary the proportion of B-type spin-offs in the population (β) and the gap between the high and low-demand dispersion scenarios (τ = δ h − δ l ).
If the TTO was only allowed to charge fixed fees, then the black and the white regions of Figure   4b would denote the regions of the model parameters where the TTO would have found it optimal to license only to the G-type (i.e. exclude the B-type) by offering a fixed fee that is too high for the B-type. Conversely, the light and dark gray regions denote the model parameters for which the TTO would have found it optimal to choose the pooling equilibrium, which licenses to both types by charging a relatively low fixed fee and allows the G-type to extract full information rents.
As in the case of equity-royalty contracts shown in Figure 2b , the white region of Figure 4b denotes the model parameters for which the introduction of royalties alongside fixed fees makes it optimal for the TTO to license technology to both types of spin-off as opposed to just the G-type.
Thus, using royalties alongside fixed fees in this case may well improve welfare despite the production distortions as the B-type is not prevented from commercializing the technology. More interestingly, in the dark gray region of the same figure, even though a fixed-fee-royalty separating equilibrium exists, it is no longer optimal for the TTO to use it to extract information from the spin-off as the royalties required to achieve separation would have simply destroyed too much value. Therefore the TTO chooses to stick with the pooling equilibrium and allow the G-type to appropriate all information rents. Note that such a region does not exist in the equity-royalty case; under equityroyalty the pooling equilibrium is always less profitable than the optimal equity-royalty separating equilibrium.
This observation provides an important argument for the use of equity instead of fixed fees as means of transferring technology by a less informed principal to a more informed agent that goes beyond financial frictions and cost of capital issues. Using equity-royalty as opposed to fixed-feeroyalty allows the TTO to screen for information for more model parameters (i.e. the dark gray region of Figure 4b ) as well as to cause fewer production distortions (i.e. the white and light gray regions of Figure 4b ). This, in turn, motivates TTOs to license to spin-off rather than established firms. Perhaps this result provides an explanation as to why universities that accept equity in lieu of fixed fees create more spin-offs as observed by Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) .
In fact, we would argue that as far as adverse selection problems are concerned, equity-royalty contracts dominate fixed-fee-royalty contracts -an argument that we make exact in the next section, where we examine more complex contracts that include fixed fees, equity, and royalties.
Equity, Fixed Fee and Royalty Contracts
In this section we expand the contract space to include all contract terms studied in the previous sections, i.e. we consider contracts that belong to the set (F, e, r)
where F is the upfront fixed fee, e is the equity stake retained by spin-off and r is the royalty per unit of production. Without loss of generality, the TTO can offer a menu of two contracts with F i , r i , e i for i ∈ {G, B}. The expected value of a spin-off of type i ignoring fixed costs C and fixed fees F i is given by π i (r i ) = θ i V l (r i ) + (1 − θ i )V h (r i ) and the value remaining with the spin-off is given by e i π i (r i ) − F i . The TTO's payoff from a spin-off of type i is given by U i (e i , r i , F i ) =
The problem of the TTO can be written as
The separating equilibria are characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Under equity, fixed-fee and royalty contracts there exist multiple payoffequivalent separating equilibria. These are characterized by the following menus of two contracts, one intended for the B-type and one for the G-type. When r ≥ min{r * , r},
. When r < min{r * , r},
such that e B (π B (r) − F B ) = C and e G (π G (0) − F G ) = C, where r * is defined in Proposition 2.
The proposition above shows that, depending on model parameters, the TTO either strictly prefers an equity stake over fixed fees or is indifferent between retaining an equity stake vs. an equally valuable upfront fixed fee (or any combination of the two with the same total value). This result provides a more formal confirmation of the intuition of the previous section: fixed-fee contracts are dominated by equity contracts. The use of royalties remains identical to the case of the equity-royalty contract and fixed fees are optional in the sense that there always exists a separating equilibrium contract with zero fixed fees.
Moral Hazard: The Case of Endogenous Effort
So far in this paper, in an attempt to illustrate the merits of including royalty terms in university technology transfer, we have chosen to abstract from moral hazard problems by assuming that the value of the spin-off is exogenously specified and fixed at the time of licensing. Clearly, this is a simplification as the university technology being transferred is often too embryonic for immediate commercialization. In a survey of leading TTOs, Jensen and Thursby (2001) report that 88% of technologies licensed required further development -in fact, over 75% of them were no more advanced than lab-scale prototypes and substantial effort was required in order to overcome hurdles such as manufacturing feasibility (Dechenaux et al. 2011) . This effort, which must be exerted by the management and the scientists of the spin-off, is costly both in terms of capital costs incurred and the time required on further development. Furthermore, since it is unobservable by the TTO, how much of it will be exerted is at the sole discretion of the spin-off. This leads to the classic moral hazard problem (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) : Will the equity and/or royalty terms imposed on the spin-off by the TTO distort effort, and does this distortion render royalties undesirable for university technology transfer? In this section we extend our model to understand how this costly endogenous effort affects our results.
To study this we expand the analysis of the base model presented in Section 3 by introducing an endogenous probability of technical success p(f ), which is a function of costly and unobservable (or unverifiable) effort f ≥ 0 that needs to be exerted by the spin-off. To simplify the analysis we employ a specific functional form for the probability of success p(f ) = 1 − exp(−f ). This assumption, which is similar to Dechenaux et al. (2011) , ensures that p(f ) is indeed a probability (i.e. 0 ≤ p ≤ 1), and that it is increasing and strictly concave in effort, f . More specifically, the payoff of the spin-off that exerts effort f , produces quantity Q, pays a fixed fee F , royalties r, and retains an equity stake e,
where κ is the cost of unit effort. Assuming that the royalties (equity) are not too high (low), i.e.
(m+δ−c−r) 2 ), the payoff is jointly concave in effort f and quantity Q. The profit maximizing quantity-effort pair is given by Q * = m+δ−c−r 4δ i and f * = log
. The payoffs of the spin-off and the TTO at the optimal production quantity and level of effort are given by
. Reassuringly, as the cost of effort κ → 0 the payoffs reduce to that of section 3.
Moral Hazard without Adverse Selection
In a setting of symmetric information where the spin-off needs to exert unverifiable and costly effort f i , both royalty payments to the TTO and equity stakes retained by the TTO cause distortions. In particular, as can be seen from the expressions for the optimal quantity Q * and effort f * i , royalties cause both quantity and effort distortions. However, equity causes effort distortion but does not affect production. Since fixed fees F do not feature in the expressions for the optimal quantity or effort, they do not cause any kind of distortion. We study the optimal technology transfer contract in this case with the following proposition.
Proposition 7. In the presence of endogenous effort and symmetric information, technology transfer based on fixed fees is preferable to either equity or royalties and equity is preferable to royalties.
Proposition 7 shows that in the presence of endogenous effort, if the TTO and the spin-off are symmetrically informed, then there exists a clear pecking order of licensing terms: Fixed fees dominate equity and equity dominates royalties. Even if the spin-off is cash constrained and the TTO has to choose between royalties and equity, the presence of moral hazard alone cannot explain the use of royalties alongside equity -if anything it makes it even more puzzling because royalties in this case cause both effort and production distortions.
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
In this section we extend the model described above to account for both uncertainty in demand and, that the spin-off is better informed than the TTO, as described in Section 3.2. We examine contracts that belong to the set (F, e, r)
The TTO can offer a menu of contracts F i , e i , r i , with i ∈ {G, B}. The TTO's payoff from a spin-off of type i is given by
and Q j (r) = m+δ j −c−r 4δ j for j ∈ {h, l}. The problem of the TTO can be written as
A complete analytical characterization of the optimal contract is possible but too complicated to be useful. Nevertheless, we can prove some of the structural properties of the optimal contract with the proposition below.
Proposition 8. Any separating equilibrium contract must satisfy r G = 0, e G = 1, F G ≥ 0 and
Proposition 8 shows that in the presence of both unobservable effort (i.e. moral hazard) and adverse selection, the optimal contract for the B-type spin-off contains all three elements: equity, royalties and fixed fees. Importantly, r B is strictly positive in any separating equilibrium (even if the moral hazard problem is severe). We also investigate the structure of the optimal solution numerically in Figure 5 . As can be seen in this figure, equity always co-exists with royalty for the B-type spin-off and fixed fees are sometimes also needed. We can therefore conclude that moral hazard does not invalidate the optimality of royalties or the coexistence of equity and royalies in university technology transfer. Furthermore, the presence of a moral hazard problem can explain the co-existence of all three contractual terms, which is often observed in university technology transfer. Consistent with Section 6.1, we see from Figure 5 that as the problem of asymmetric information becomes less prominent (i.e. γ → 0) the equity retained by the TTO and the royalties are both reduced to zero.
Conversely, as the moral hazard problem becomes less prominent (i.e. κ → 0) fixed fees are reduced to zero and the optimal contract contains a combination of equity and royalties, consistent with Section 4.1. While the curves show the optimal contracts for a separating equilibrium, when the moral hazard problem is extreme it may be optimal not to screen and exclude B-types by offering the fixed fee that binds the participation constraint of the G-type (shaded region of Figure 5b ).
(a) (b)
Figure 5 Contract Terms Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Discussion and Conclusion
University spin-offs are increasingly important in translating university-based research to commercial application (Shane 2004) . Not surprisingly, a substantial body of research has been developed in an attempt to describe the spin-off phenomenon and understand their creation process (see Section 4.3 of the review by Rothaermel et al. (2007) ). To the extent that universities aim to retain some of the economic value of the university-created IP that the spin-offs aim to further develop and commercialize, they find it necessary to negotiate licensing agreements. Therefore, contracts, and in particular the type of contractual terms used, play a critical role in fostering spin-off creation.
It is for this reason that the persistent use of royalties in such contracts appears to be a puzzle as it is well documented that they cause distortions in the optimal level of production (and effort exerted). In this paper we introduce a model in which the TTO is asymmetrically informed vis-a-vis the spin-off with regard to the market potential of the innovation. We use this model to examine the properties of contracts that include fixed fees, equity and royalties.
We start our investigation by assuming that the value of the spin-off is exogenously specified.
Similarly to earlier work (for example Jensen and Thursby (2001) ), we show that the inclusion of royalties in our model causes production distortions. Nevertheless, we show that in the presence of asymmetric information it is optimal to include royalties in contracts intended for less promising spin-offs as the asymmetric distortional effect of royalties allows them to act as a screening mechanism -the high-quality spin-off would be willing to give up a larger equity share in order to avoid having to pay royalties. Furthermore, we find that royalties are more effective as a screening mechanism when used in conjunction with equity rather than fixed fees. This is due to an interaction between equity and royalties -higher equity shares exacerbate the distortion caused by royalties and therefore a high-quality spin-off will be even less inclined to misrepresent its type and take the higher equity stake intended for low-quality spin-offs if it also means that it will have to pay royalties. In accordance with this result, we find that the TTO does not gain anything from expanding the contract set to include a fixed fee -equity dominates fixed fees completely. Our analysis shows that being able to add royalties alongside either equity or fixed fees allows licensing of university technology to low-value spin-offs that the TTO would otherwise have found it optimal to exclude.
Nevertheless, the equity-royalty contract has two advantages over the fixed-fee-royalty contract when the spin-off is of low value. First, it imposes lower royalty levels on the spin-off, which in turn causes less value-destroying distortions. Second, it allows the TTO to screen spin-offs (i.e. choose the separating equilibrium over the pooling) over a wider range of parameter values. To the best of our knowledge, these observations have not been made before in the licensing literature.
When we endogenize the probability of technical success (i.e. introduce a moral hazard problem), fixed fees play a more important role. We show that when moral hazard is the only informational friction (i.e. no adverse selection), there exists a clear pecking order of contract terms: Fixed fees dominate both equity and royalties as they do not cause any distortions, and equity dominates royalties as it only causes effort but not production distortions. Royalties perform the worst as they cause both types of distortion. Therefore, the presence of moral hazard alone cannot explain the persistent use of royalties observed empirically. When both adverse selection and moral hazard are at play, the optimal contract includes all of fixed fees, equity and royalties. The presence of moral hazard with adverse selection therefore not only does not invalidate the optimality of using royalties with equity but also explains why all three elements -fixed fees, equity and royalties -are used in practice.
Our model sheds light on some empirical observations. First, we show that adverse selection (with or without moral hazard) provides a rational explanation for the persistent use of royalties along with equity (and fixed fees) by TTOs. Second, our work suggests that selection bias may be an alternative explanation for the empirically documented superior performance of equity over royalties (Bray and Lee 2000) -ceteris paribus, equity-only contracts are intended for spin-offs of the highest quality while royalty-only contracts are intended for spin-offs of very low quality. Third, our findings may explain why TTOs that are willing to take equity in lieu of fixed fees create more spin-offs (Di Gregorio and Shane (2003)) -fixed-fee-royalty contracts cause more severe distortions and discourage licensing to less promising spin-offs more than equity-royalty contracts do.
In addition to explaining existing empirical observations, our work generates hypotheses that can be tested with further empirical research. To the extent that more experience in technology transfer leads TTOs to be less asymmetrically informed about the market potential of new technologies, our model predicts that more experienced TTOs will require lower levels of royalties and retain higher levels of equity when licensing technology to their spin-offs. 5 Future empirical work could investigate these hypotheses.
Last but not least, we believe that recognizing and mitigating problems of asymmetric information in university and corporate technology transfer can be an important driver in accelerating technology commercialization. Our work suggests that creating new spin-off companies (or joint ventures) to commercialize new technology is more efficient than licensing to incumbents because the licensor can take an equity stake whose value is closely linked to the value of the new company, which, in conjunction with royalties, is shown to be a more efficient way of transferring technology than fixed fees. Such carefully designed contracts may enhance the ability of institutions that produce IP through basic research to retain a larger share of the value they generate, which, in turn, will ensure that they have the resources and incentives, both financial and organizational, to further fund research and better facilitate technology transfer. This will encourage spin-off creation with knock-on effects on the economic performance and job creation capacity of both local and national economies.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 2
Since the feasible region is compact and all payoffs are continuous, an appeal to the Weierstrass Theorem proves the existence of a maximum for this problem. The constraints e G ≥ 0 and e B ≥ 0 are redundant as they are implied by constraints (2) and (2). The payoff U (e G , e B , r G , r B ) is decreasing in both e B and e G . Therefore, at least one of the individual rationality constraints should be binding.
If it were not, the TTO could decrease both e B and e G by the same fraction, which would leave the incentive compatibility constraints unaffected, but increase its payoff. We check two cases; in the first case IRB binds and in the second case IRG binds.
Case 1: IRB is binding, which implies that
π G (r B ). Then, at least one of a) ICG or b) IRG needs to be binding. This follows from the fact that, once we substitute the above expression for e B into the relevant constraints, reducing e G 5 A slightly different hypothesis, on the proportion of deals that include some element of equity in the portfolio of a TTO as a function of the TTO's experience was investigated by Feldman et al. (2002) and Lockett et al. (2003) . Feldman et al. (2002) find that the TTOs with the highest proportion of equity deals are more likely to be based in more experienced universities. Lockett et al. (2003) find that TTOs that have been more successful in spin-off creation are more likely to both employ experienced specialists who are dedicated to the establishment of technology-based spin-offs and include equity positions alongside royalties (and fixed fees) in their licenses to these spin-offs.
by some fraction increases the objective and does not affect ICB. Therefore we can keep reducing e G until at least one of IRG or ICG binds.
Case 1a: IRB and ICG are binding. The two binding constraints e B π B (r B ) = C and e G π G (r G ) = e B π G (r B ) allow us to eliminate e B and e G from the problem. Using this, IRG can now be written as π G (r B ) ≥ π B (r B ) and the constraint e B ≤ 1 can be written as π B (r B ) ≥ C.
Next, we relax the problem by ignoring the ICB constraint, which holds at first best and e G ≤ 1.
We will check whether these constraints are satisfied at optimum. The relaxed program becomes
and π B (r B ) ≥ C, which are equivalent to IRG and e B ≤ 1 respectively.
Note that r G does not appear in the constraints except r G ≥ 0 and that
which is negative for all r G > 0 and zero for r G = 0, therefore at the optimal contract r G = 0. We are left with a single variable optimization problem. The first constraint implies
Note that r > 0 as m − c > δ h > δ l . The second constraint implies r B ≤ r, where r is the positive root of the quadratic equation π B (r) = C, which can be written as r = m − c − u, where u =
. That r > 0 exists and is unique is a consequence of the fact that π B (0) > C, lim x→∞ π B (x) = 0 and π B (r) is continuous decreasing in r. The derivative of the objective function with respect to r B , when r B ≤ r, is given by
Since δ h > δ l and θ G > θ B there exists a positive r
(r * ) = 0. That such an r exists is a consequence of
(0, r) < 0 and ∂U ∂r B
(0, r) is continuous in (0, m + δ l − c). Therefore the optimal royalty will be min{r * , r, r}.
We will now check if ICB and e G ≤ 1 are satisfied at optimum. At optimum, r G ≤ r B . Since
≤ e B ≤ 1. ICB can be written as
At the optimal contract m − c ≥ r B ≥ r G = 0, therefore ICB is satisfied.
The remaining cases do not yield any new separating equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3
The royalty rate is given by r B = min{r, r * , r}. Note that r and r are independent of θ G = θ B + γ and are therefore not affected by the degree of asymmetric information γ. We investigate r * below.
Starting from its definition and differentiating with respect to γ we get
where v is a positive constant (i.e. independent of r and γ). Therefore, ∂r ∂γ
> 0 is equivalent to
The LHS, after some algebra, can be written as
. This is equivalent to
is always satisfied when
To prove the second part, note that e B depends on γ only when r = r * , in which case
has the same sign as ∂r *
∂γ . Similarly, note that when r = r then e B = C π B (r) which is (linear) increasing in C, when r = r then e B = 1 which is independent of C, and when r = r * then
∂C . Note that r * is homomorphic in C and γ therefore ∂r *
∂C has the same sign as ∂r *
∂γ , which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since the feasible region is compact and all payoffs are continuous, an appeal to the Weierstrass Theorem proves the existence of a maximum for this problem. The objective U (F G , F B , r G , r B ) is increasing in both F B and F G . Therefore, at least one of the individual rationality constraints should be binding. If it were not, the TTO could increase both F B and F G by the same increment, which would leave the incentive compatibility constraints unaffected, but increase its payoff. We check two cases; in the first case IRB binds and in the second case IRG binds.
Case 1: IRB is binding which implies that
Then, at least one of a) ICG or b) IRG needs to be binding.
This follows from the fact that, once we substitute the above expression for F B into the relevant constraints, increasing F G by some amount increases the objective value and does not affect ICB.
Therefore we can keep increasing F G until at least one of IRG or ICG binds.
Case 1a: IRB and ICG are binding. The two binding constraints
− F B allow us to eliminate F B and F G from the problem. Using this, IRG can now be written as π G (r B ) ≥ π B (r B ) and the constraint F B ≥ 0 can be written as π B (r B ) ≥ C.
Next, we relax the problem by ignoring ICB, which holds at first best and F G ≥ 0. We will check whether these constraints are satisfied at optimum. The relaxed program becomes
subject to π G (r B ) ≥ π B (r B ) and π B (r B ) ≥ C, which are equivalent to IRG and F B ≥ 1 respectively.
which is negative for all r G > 0 and zero for r G = 0, therefore at optimum r G = 0. We are left with a single variable optimization problem. The first constraint implies r B ≤ r = m − c − √ δ h δ l . Note that r > 0 as m − c > δ h > δ l . The second constraint implies r B ≤ r.
The derivative of the objective function with respect to r B , when r B ≤ r, is given by
Solving ∂U ∂r B
(r * ) = 0, we find r
. Therefore the optimal royalty will be min{r * , r, r}.
We will now check if ICB is satisfied at optimum. ICB can be written as
The LHS simplifies to
, which is greater than zero since
Rearranging, this inequality gives
The two omitted constraints are therefore satisfied. The remaining cases do not yield any new separating equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since the values of r and r given in Proposition 4 are equal to the corresponding royalties of Proposition 2, we will proceed by showing that r * of Proposition 2 is less than that in Proposition 4. Denote the first by r 1 and the second by r 2 . Then r 1 is given by setting the expression of (4) to zero while the r 2 is given by setting the expression of (5) to zero. Rearranging (4) and (5) gives
) and f 2 (r) = m − c − r. Note that f 2 is decreasing in r. Therefore to show that r 1 < r 2 it will be sufficient
For r < m − c − √ δ l δ h , which implies that x > √ δ l δ h , the above expression is always positive.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since the feasible region is compact and all payoffs are continuous, an appeal to the Weierstrass Theorem proves the existence of a maximum for this problem. The constraints e G , e B ≥ 0 are redundant as they are implied by the individual rationality constraints. The objective
is increasing in both F B and F G . Therefore, at least one of the individual rationality constraints should be binding. If it were not, the TTO could increase both F B and F G by the same amount, which would leave the incentive compatibility constraints unaffected, but increase its payoff. We check two cases, in the first case IRB binds and in the second case IRG binds.
Then, at least one of a) ICG or b) IRG needs to be binding. This follows from the fact that, once we substitute the above expression for F B into the relevant constraints, increasing F G by some amount increases the objective value and does not affect ICB. Therefore we can keep increasing F G until at least one of IRG or ICG binds.
) − C allow us to eliminate F B and F G from the problem. The value for the TTO that deals with a spin-off of type G becomes
Similarly, the IRG constraint can be written as r B ≤ r and the constraint F B ≥ 0 can be written as e B π B (r B ) ≥ C.
First, we note that the objective does not depend on e G , therefore any e G ≤ 1 that satisfies ICG
Next, we relax the problem by ignoring the ICB constraint, which holds at first best. We will check whether this constraint is satisfied at optimum. The problem becomes
subject to e B ≤ 1, π G (r B ) ≥ π B (r B ) and e B π B (r B ) ≥ C. The last two constraints are equivalent to IRG and F B ≥ 0 respectively. Furthermore, the constraint π G (r B ) ≥ π B (r B ) can be written as r ≤ r.
which is negative for all r G > 0 and zero for r G = 0, therefore at optimum r G = 0. The derivative of the utility function with respect to e B is given by
). This is negative for r B < r and zero for r B = r. Assuming that r B < r then the optimal e B is given by e B = C π B (r B )
. The constraint e B ≤ 1 implies r ≤ r. The derivative of the objective with respect to r B is given by
which is zero at r * , which was shown to exist in the proof of Proposition 2. Therefore the objective is maximized at r B = min{r, r * } provided that r > min{r, r * }. If r ≤ min{r, r * } then the objective is maximized at r B = r and the TTO is indifferent between any F B ≥ 0 and e B ≥ 0 such that
We now check that the constraint ICB is satisfied at the solution identified above. By eliminating and without loss of generality we can choose
The proof then proceeds as in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 7
The problem of the TTO is given by max
(m+δ−c−r) 2 ≤ e ≤ 1, where V S (F, e, r) and U (F, e, r) are given by (2) and (3), respectively. Clearly, the first constraint will be binding at the solution; if it was not the TTO could increase the fixed fee F which would increase the objective function. Therefore we can use the binding constraint to eliminate F from the objective. The derivative of the objective wrt to r is given by , which is negative for any r > 0, therefore at the solution r = 0. Similarly, the derivative of the objective wrt to e at r = 0 is given by ∂V T T O ∂e = κ e 2 (1 − e), which is positive for any e < 1, therefore at the solution e = 1, which proves that the value-maximizing contract for the TTO contains fixed fees only.
To compare equity to royalty we fix F = 0. First, assume that the constraint V S (0, e, r) ≥ 0 is not binding. Then the derivatives of the objective function wrt to e and r are given by and r = 0.
Second, assume that the constraint V S (0, e, r) ≥ 0 is binding. This allows us to eliminate e from the objective and the derivative of the objective wrt to r is given by 1 − 8κδ e(m+δ−c−r) 2 , which again is negative for all r > 0 suggesting that the optimal occurs ar r = 0. The second order conditions in all cases confirm that the stationary point is indeed a maximum.
Proof of Proposition 8
Since the feasible region is compact and all payoffs are continuous, an appeal to the Weierstrass Theorem proves the existence of a maximum for this problem. Since π i (r) = 0 for r ≥ m + δ h − c, we can conclude that the optimal royalties will have to satisfy r B , r G ≤ m + δ h − c. Since all payoffs are continuous, an appeal to the Weierstrass Theorem proves the existence of a maximum for this problem. The constraints e G , e B ≥ 0 are redundant as they are implied by the individual rationality constraints. The payoff U (F G , F B , e G , e B , r G , r B ) is increasing in both F B and F G . Therefore, at least one of the individual rationality constraints should be binding. If it were not, the TTO could increase both F B and F G by the same amount, which would leave the incentive compatibility constraints unaffected, but increase its payoff. As with the proof of the previous proposition at optimum the IRB and ICG constraints are binding. These imply F B = e B π B (r B ) − κ 1 + log e B π B (r B ) κ − C,
respectively. The value for the TTO that deals with a G or B-type spin-off can be written as + e B (π G (r B ) − π B (r B )) ≥ 0, and the constraint F B ≥ 0 can be written as e B π B (r B ) − κ log e B π B (r B ) κ ≥ C + κ. We ignore the ICB constraint (which holds at first best) and the constraint F G ≥ 0 for now. We will check that they are satisfied at the end. The problem becomes Note that e G only appears in the constraint e G ≤ 1 and
, which is positive for any e G < 1. Therefore the objective is maximized at e G = 1. Similarly, r G only appears in the constraint r G ≥ 0. At e G = 1,
r G Q G (r G ) is negative for any r G > 0. Therefore the objective is maximized at r G = 0.
We are left with the following constrained optimization problem max e B ,r B U (e B , r B ) = (1 − β)U G (e B , r B ) + βU B (e B , r B ) We proceed to show that r B = 0 cannot be a solution, i.e. that the constraint h 4 ≥ 0 cannot be binding. The Lagrangian of the problem is given by L = U (e B , r B ) + λ 1 h 1 (e B , r B ) + λ 2 h 2 (e B , r B ) + Finally, we needs to check that for r B > r G = 0 and e G = 1 the two omitted constraints (ICB and . Therefore ICB is satisfied if u(r) is a decreasing function of r for all r ≤ m + δ h − c. Indeed this is the case since
where we have used the fact that for all r ≤ m + δ h − c the following inequalities hold π G (r) ≥ π B (r), Q G (r) ≥ Q B (r) and κ < π B (r). To show that F G > 0 we start from ICB and substitute for F B to get
The RHS is the value of the B-type spin-off that retains 100%
of the equity and does not pay any royalties or fixed fees and it is non-negative by assumption.
